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Abstract 
Improvements in the welfare of farmed animals in the EU have been achieved by legislation, 
increased welfare capacity in the food chain, greater public awareness, welfare measurement 
tools and dissemination of best practice.  However, pressure for improvement grows.  The EC 
recognises that delivering improved welfare would best be achieved by increasing welfare 
capacity, including establishing a Network of Welfare Reference Centres to provide support for 
welfare research, knowledge transfer and policy design.  Designing a structure for this Network 
presents a challenge, as it would have multiple functions, interact with diverse stakeholders and 
operate in a complex environment.  Here, we describe the use of a novel strategic planning 
approach to design an optimal structure for this Network.  Our evaluation found that no existing 
structure was ideal, but that by taking functional units from several existing models, an optimal 
model could be identified.  
Keywords: animal welfare; network of Reference Centres. 
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Introduction 
 
Legislation to prevent cruelty, reflecting societal expectations and producer realities, coupled 
with monitoring and enforcement by governments, is the foundation of farmed animal welfare 
protection across the EU (European Commission, 2007a; Bennett and Appleby, 2010). These 
interventions, for example EU Directive 98/58/EC, are undertaken where there is deemed to be 
a failure of the market to deliver the minimum welfare standards demanded by EU citizens. One 
reason for market failure is that because evidence of poor welfare is not apparent in products 
the welfare capacity of the market is too limited. For example, if food marketing chains are not 
sufficiently developed to provide information about the welfare standards under which products 
are produced, consumers cannot make informed choices based on welfare provenance (FAWC, 
2009; Mancini and Arfini, 2012).  
 
A number of drivers of change in the welfare ‘capacity’ of the food chain have taken place since 
the EU Protocol on Animal Welfare of 1997 (Bennett and Appleby, 2010). These include, on the 
supply side: new systems for measuring welfare; improved farmer awareness and training; and 
animal husbandry technologies.  On the demand side, public awareness of, and concern for, 
animal welfare has increased. The market has responded to these developments by instituting a 
range of welfare capacity enhancing measures, including: voluntary welfare codes; corporate 
social responsibility programmes; codes of practice for private sector food procurement; product 
labelling/certification schemes; and international agreements. 
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While the above market and legislative measures have broadly improved welfare, some sub-
optimal welfare persists due to failure to comply with existing measures, either through 
avoidance, or management failures, as reported in a seminal article by Broom (1991). To 
illustrate, for the UK, FAWC (2009) reported a persistent level of non-compliance with welfare 
legislation. The FAO (Fraser et al., 2009) have argued that further improvement in welfare will 
only result from increasing the uptake of existing voluntary schemes and minimising avoidance 
of statutory minima, through increasing the welfare capacity of the food chain, for example 
through: education; engagement; training; and communication.  
 
The EU ‘Community Action Plan on the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2006-2010’ (EC, 
2006) suggested that welfare capacity building in the food chain should involve upgrading 
minimum standards, standardisation of animal welfare indicators, training animal keepers and 
raising public awareness. In recognition of the cross-cutting and international nature of welfare 
issues, the Action Plan also identified the need for the establishment of a European Centre for 
the co-ordination of welfare-promoting activities.  
 
Responding to this, the EC (2009), considering the organisational structure of this future Centre, 
argued that existing EU institutions involved with welfare, such as the European Food Safety 
Authority or the EC Joint Research Centre, were inadequate to fulfil this role.  What was 
needed, therefore, was the establishment of a Network of smaller Reference Centres, rather 
than a single large centre, to ‘provide technical support for developing animal welfare policies 
including certification and labelling’. In response, the European Parliament (2009) proposed that 
such a co-ordinated Network of Centres for animal welfare might be set-up incorporating 
existing Community or Member State institutions, one of which would be designated as the Co-
ordinating Body.  
4 
 
 
The EC (2013) issued a new proposal, updating their 2009 proposal, to provide the legal basis 
for the establishment of the Network of Reference Centres through a regulation to update 
Regulation (EC) 882/2004 which provides the legislative framework for organising official 
controls to ensure the verification of compliance with animal health and welfare rules and the 
establishment of the Network of Reference Centres. The 2013 proposal defined the roles of the 
Centres as:  
 provide assistance to the Commission, Member States, food chain actors and citizens 
regarding training, best practice, information and consumer communication; 
 assess future legislative and policy proposals and their impact on animal welfare;  
 assess animal welfare standards on the basis of the latest available knowledge; and 
 co-ordinate a EU system for testing new techniques.  
 
These proposed roles echoed those identified for the putative Network of Reference Centres 
proposed in an earlier strategy document (EC, 2012).  In tandem with the 2013 proposal, DG 
SANCO (2012/10293) defined a number of constraints within which the Network should operate 
i.e. it should: have only a co-ordinating role with no statutory powers; avoid duplicating work of 
existing Competent Authorities; be flexible enough to include new stakeholders and new 
Member States; and the annual budget should not exceed €5.8M. 
 
However, to this point, there had been no detailed determinations on the organisational 
structure of the Network, in part perhaps, because there are several difficulties in doing so. First, 
the Network’s internal environment is complex due to the nature and number of actors forming 
the Network, together with its multi-sectorial mission. Second, there are significant pre-defined 
constraints on the organisational structure (see list above), and third, the ‘external’ environment 
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within which the Network has to operate is complex due to the large number of organisations 
outside the Network that could impinge on its activities but over which the Network may or may 
not be able to exercise any control (Palmer and Hartley, 2011).  
 
Recognising these difficulties, DG SANCO commissioned a consortium of 16 universities and 
10 research institutes from 16 Member States to evaluate alternative organisational structures 
for the Network using an appropriate and rigorous methodology and accommodating key 
functional requirements and political and economic constraints (Veissier et al., 2013). This 
Research Note reports on this work and describes the methodology used to review and 
evaluate alternative models of organisational structure andproposes an optimal organisational 
structure for the future EU Network of welfare Reference Centre.   
 
Method 
 
The study had two distinct stages (Veissier et al., 2013). Stage I reviewed and identified 
relevant organisations for use as ‘organisational’ models for the Network and created a criteria-
based screening methodology to provide a shortlist for Stage II, the testing of the organisations 
for suitability.   
 
At various points in the evaluation, informed decisions were taken on such issues as the choice 
of exemplar organisations and the identification of evaluation criteria and the ranking of their 
importance. Unless otherwise stated, these were made by an Expert Group composed of 47 
animal welfare experts from a range of disciplines and stakeholders from national authorities, 
EU institutions, international welfare organisations, industry groups and NGOs. 
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In Stage I, the structure of the 12 candidate organisations was mapped and evaluated. This 
involved judgements about the suitability of each structure for the work the Network will be 
required to do, plus the constraints specified by DG SANCO. The Expert Group identified and 
ranked organisations according to seven criteria focussed on their mission statements and 15 
criteria assessing organisational function.  Each of these were allocated a weight by the Expert 
Group reflecting their relative importance (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Stage II involved assessing the suitability of the structures of the three most prospective 
organisations shortlisted in Stage I. To do this, a suitable analytical technique had to be 
identified. It has been argued that the viability of an organisation, or organisational structure, 
cannot be understood without reference to the external ‘environment’ in which it operates 
(Duncan, 1972; Buchannan and Cribb, 1998). One of the most commonly used tools for such 
‘environmental’ evaluations is the PEST framework (Aguilar, 1967), which defines the external 
environment of organisations in terms of Political, Economic, Social and Technological 
dimensions. The PEST framework has become the mainstay of strategic planning, because it 
helps managers understand the context in which organisations do business (Glaister and 
Falshaw, 1999). PEST analysis involves three steps: 
• determine factors within the PEST dimensions that impact on the operation of the 
organisation; 
• identify (and collect) data relating to these (states, quantities, change directions); and 
• draw conclusions from this on the impacts of different factors on the organisation. 
 
PEST is the simplest form of this type of environmental scanning framework but has been 
variously extended to account for other dimensions of operating environments, such as the 
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physical environment in PESTE analysis (Richardson, 2006) and legal considerations in 
PESTLE (Kolios and Read, 2013). PEST is, therefore, a very flexible evaluation framework that 
can be adapted to capture a range of dimensions of the environments in which organisations 
operate. 
 
PEST is an ideal approach in this case as it is necessary to characterise the external 
environment in which the future Network would operate in terms of Political, Economic, Social 
and Technological dimensions.  However, here we are required to consider not only the external 
environment in which the Network must operate i.e. in terms of the opportunities and constraints 
that this might present, but also its internal ‘environment’ reflected in the organisational 
constraints imposed by DG SANCO. (Veissier et al., 2013).  Adding this ‘organisational’ 
dimension to the evaluation framework creates PESTO i.e. a more holistic framing of both the 
external and internal environment. 
 
Perhaps the most tried and tested management planning approach used to evaluate the 
qualities of an organisation’s internal  environment, within the context of its external 
environment, is SWOT (or TOWS) analysis, whereby the external environment is characterised 
by Opportunities and Threats and the internal environment characterised by Strengths and 
Weaknesses (Weihrich, 1982).  Some researchers have combined PEST and SWOT-type 
approaches to allow for a more nuanced and structured analysis than either approach would 
individually allow (see Srdjevic et al., 2012; and Yüksel, 2012).  We adopt this same joint 
approach here, evaluating the Strengths and Weaknesses of internal organisational structures 
in the context of the PEST (external) and O (internal) environment dimensions.  This evaluation 
framework is termed SWEPSOT. 
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Within each of the economic, political, social, organisational and technical dimensions, a whole 
array of factors might potentially have some impact on the organisational requirements of the 
future Network.  As a means to reducing this complexity, the subset of these factors deemed to 
be most influential was identified.  This task was undertaken by the authors in combination with 
the project’s Expert Group and is reported in full in Veissier et al. (2013). The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The factors identified within each of the ‘E’, ‘P’, ‘S’, ‘O’ and ‘T’ dimensions obviously vary in the 
extent to which they impact on the Network’s organisational requirements.  A fully nuanced 
SWEPSOT analysis might, therefore, have attempted to apply weights to these factors to reflect 
their relative importance.  However, such a weighting was not necessary here as the subset of 
factors identified were chosen on the basis that each was so important that good performance 
on each was essential for the adequate functioning of the future Network. 
 
To undertake the SWEPSOT analysis, a contingency table was constructed for each 
organisational structure.  Each table contained two columns (see Table 3) representing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organisational structure (i.e. the internal environment) and five 
rows, representing the ‘E’, ‘P’, ‘S’ and ‘T’ dimensions of the external environment and the ‘O’ 
organisational constraints.  While the strengths and weaknesses of each organisational 
structure on each of these five dimensions are identified, it should be remembered that the 
strength and weakness columns do not themselves represent two separate dimensions, but 
rather opposing ends of the same continuum.  A weakness is, simply put, the absence of a 
strength.  For this reason, it was not necessary to use both the strengths and weaknesses 
evaluation criteria in the process of identifying organisational structures that fail to deliver 
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required functionality.  Therefore, decisions on the relative suitability of different organisational 
structures was based on the number of weaknesses identified with each. 
  
Results 
 
Introduction 
 
The 14 organisations selected for the Stage I screening were classified on the basis of their 
organisational structure, with three types identified: ‘centralised’; ‘specialised’; and ‘distributed’. 
The characteristics of these typologies are described below. To avoid duplication, one 
representative organisation from each of these three typologies was then selected for the Stage 
II analysis. Full details of the strengths and weaknesses of each typology are given by Veissier 
et al. (2013). 
 
Descriptions of the three organisational structure typologies 
 
In the ‘centralised’ organisational structure (like the European Food Safety Authority), co-
ordination of National Reference Centres (RC) would be undertaken by one Co-ordinating Body 
(CB), probably an EU agency, that formulates strategy, leading to considerable harmonisation 
between RCs in each MS in terms of  knowledge sharing etc. RCs would be pre-existing bodies 
dealing with welfare issues, such as state veterinary services or ministries of agriculture. RCs, 
covering all species and topics, would apply strategy formulated from the centre and send data 
(e.g. on compliance) in return. Temporary transnational working groups (WG) would be 
established to discuss issues beyond the remit of the CB, such as specific topics requiring 
scientific input or regional perspectives. Network operating costs, excluding special projects, 
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would be largely incurred by the MS-funded RC. The CB would need an office with staff situated 
in one MS. EU costs for this Network would be ‘medium’ on a scale of low to high. 
 
Under the ‘specialised’ organisational structure (e.g. the European Innovation Partnership) the 
CB, as a service of the Commission, would coordinate a few RCs i.e. research or technical 
institutes which may have particular specialisations, such as a single livestock species (SP), or 
a multi-species issue (I). The CB would share knowledge with the RCs, set overall priorities and 
collect data. Each MS would nominate a national institution to interact with each RC.  RCs 
would be new institutions, established in a few MS. Costs to the EU would be ‘high’ due to the 
requirement for centrally funded capital investment and operating costs for the RCs. 
 
Under the ‘distributed’ structure (like the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), 
the CB would be a service of the Commission with a purely advisory role. There would be a RC 
in each MS, covering all species and topics with each setting their own priorities within a global 
strategy. Decision-making on strategy would be shared between the CB and all RCs, making 
exchanges between them frequent. RCs could be existing organisations, so infrastructure and 
operating costs would be covered by the MS. Networking would be implemented between 
stakeholders within MS, on specific projects. EU-incurred operating costs would be ‘medium’ 
due to the need to coordinate a large Network (i.e. workshops, travel). 
 
SWEPSOT analysis of the organisational structure typologies 
 
Using the SWEPSOT methodology, the three different organisational structures were evaluated 
in terms of the five dimensions of the operating environment (Veissier et al., 2013). This found 
that the top-down approach of the centralised organisational structure has benefits for 
harmonisation between MS in terms of identifying compliance problems and sharing knowledge. 
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However, this arrangement has political and social weaknesses because engagement is 
weakened i.e. national RCs are unable to influence policies. There would be a social upside 
because the nationally-based RCs would ensure that implementation was sympathetic to local 
customs. While the Network would incur significant centralised costs due to the requirement to 
fund the CB and WGs, this could be reduced if the CB was located away from Brussels, and the 
RCs would be nationally funded. Politically, the location of the CB in one MS might be seen as 
controversial and thus be contested by other MSs.  
 
The specialised structure has technical strengths in that RCs are research institutes. Political 
and social advantage is gained by sharing decision-making between the CB and the RCs. 
However, the political downside is that EU funding of the RCs could lead to the perception of 
centralised influence over priority setting, with RCs being simply mouthpieces. Nevertheless, 
this could represent a social strength if this is perceived to lead to an increase in trustworthiness 
and competence. Technical disadvantage may occur if geographical decentralisation of RCs 
leads to bias towards national self-interest. Additionally, this structure might be seen as 
inflexible as a new topic would require a new RC to be established.  
 
The distributed structure has political and social benefits from the greater role that national RCs 
play in policy setting. However, there is a political and technical downside-risk that each national 
RC might develop their own strategies with little dissemination of best practice. Organisationally, 
the number of RCs would make coordination difficult.  
 
Choosing an ideal organisational structure 
 
Based on the analysis summarised above, the Expert Group concluded that each organisational 
typology had obvious weaknesses, and that these were severe enough that none of these 
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typologies was suitable as a model for a future welfare Network. Therefore, an alternative 
approach (a ‘Regional’ typology) was developed, combining the best elements of the three 
exemplar typologies to maximise strengths and minimise weaknesses.  
 
The centralised typology offers the benefits of technical harmonisation, through the actions of 
the CB, but this creates negative political and social outcomes. However, these benefits are 
retained in the Regional typology, and the downside reduced, by making the CB semi-
autonomous i.e. comprising representatives of the Commission and RC, rather than vesting 
control in an EC agency or service. There would be a network of five regionally-based RCs (see 
Figure 1) and their representatives would chair the CB in biennial rotation. RCs would retain 
input to the CB via their representatives, but the CB would still carry out policy development, 
strategic planning and priority setting. CB decisions could be taken by qualified majority voting, 
in light of the extension of this practice in EU decision-making under the Lisbon Treaty 
(European Commission, 2007b). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The RCs would be knowledge providers co-ordinating dialogue and the flow of information 
between themselves and other actors in each MS. RCs would deal with all species and topics, 
but may also have some particular specialisation, thereby eliminating local bias towards single 
issues or species and keeping central costs down. This approach also retains the benefits of 
technical specialisation seen under the centralised and specialised typologies arising from 
regional or national clusters of expertise.  
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Although localization of RCs provides weaker co-ordination benefits than the centralised 
typology, it still offers more in this regard than the distributed typology and will offer a good 
balance between providing freedom for local initiatives and the need for central co-ordination. 
Networking within regions would facilitate trust and confidence from Network users and the 
engagement of national stakeholders.  
 
Devolvement of responsibility for dissemination and data collection to specialist RCs does mean 
some risk of fragmentation of activity and uneven performance, but implementation will be more 
sympathetic to local conditions. Effective support for regions from the CB would be necessary, 
through co-ordination of links between RCs to provide help to regions that currently do not have 
expertise on particular aspects of animal welfare. While CB operating costs would be minimal, 
this function being somewhat ‘virtual’ in nature, higher demands on EU finances would result 
from the establishment and operation of five new regional RCs. The EU-funding requirement for 
a Network with this organisational structure would, therefore, be ‘high’. 
 
Although the regional typology would not be the cheapest option, this structure, albeit a 
compromise, appears to offer the most strengths and fewest weaknesses of the options 
considered, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Whilst some have argued for PEST and SWOT-type analytical frameworks to be replaced by 
more ‘modern’ techniques (e.g. Hill and Westbrook, 1997), they continue to be the mainstay of 
corporate strategy development. The longevity of these approaches derives from their 
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transparency, simplicity and flexibility. The policy planning exercise reported here has made full 
use of these advantages, first by amalgamating the PEST and SWOT techniques to create a 
bespoke analytical framework, then by embedding this within a larger resource and 
competency-based analytical process. 
 
This multi-stage analytical process has provided a systematic framework through which expert 
stakeholders have been able to define the complex operating environment within which the 
putative Welfare Network would have to operate, together with the constraints arising within 
these dimensions. This has allowed a thoughtful balancing of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different organisational structures in relation to these dimensions.  
 
Tensions between dimensions were found to be numerous. The need to achieve a balance 
between these has led to what might be seen as a technically sub-optimal outcome. However, 
the need to account for political constraints in this assessment makes technically sub-optimal 
solutions unavoidable. Policy decision-making in the EU must deal with rather partisan views, 
where national interests are at stake in the allocation of resources and the establishment of new 
institutions, or institutional roles. The SWEPSOT-based assessment process accommodates 
this political ‘challenge’. 
 
The typology-based approach used here to characterise organisational structures was flexible 
enough to allow the de-composition of functional units within organisational typologies, making it 
possible to isolate ‘ideal’ functional units, so that these could be combined into a novel, 
bespoke, organisational structure for the future Network i.e. the regional typology. 
 
The use of the SWEPSOT framework has solved a complex optimisation problem in identifying 
an organisational structure that delivers multiple outputs, making best use of limited resources, 
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subject to a set of economic, political, organisational, social and technical constraints. The fact 
that the SWEPSOT framework, has facilitated the design of an optimal organisational structure, 
within such a complex and constraining set of environmental conditions, suggests that this 
evaluation framework would be suitable for use in the design of other complex EU institutions 
that also have to operate in highly complex and constraining environments, or the evaluation of 
existing EU institutions to identify options for increasing their organisational efficiency. 
 
Societal concern for the welfare of farmed animals continues to grow and is most visibly 
expressed in public outrage at media exposure of failures to meet minimum welfare standards in 
livestock production, transport and slaughter and continued calls, often voiced through 
campaigning groups, for yet higher welfare standards to be reflected in new legislation.  The EU 
and MS governments recognise this pressure for change in their animal welfare strategy 
documents, for example the ‘Animal Health and Welfare Strategy for Great Britain’ (Defra, 2004) 
which described the current state of farmed animal health and welfare as ‘neither adequate or 
sustainable’. EU policy-makers are, therefore, faced with the challenge of responding to these 
demands for higher welfare in a way that does not unduly disadvantage EU livestock producers, 
who are already facing fierce competition for market share from lower-cost producers outside 
the EU, such as Brazil and Thailand.  However, rather than legislate to create an uplifted 
welfare ‘floor’, EU policy-makers have recognised that sustainable welfare improvements would 
be best achieved through market-based measures.  It is also recognised that for this to be 
delivered, further increases in the welfare capacity of the food chain are necessary.  Such 
capacity building requires the construction of alliances among a wide range of organisations 
with an interest in livestock production, the food chain and animal welfare, based on a shared 
understanding of goals, co-ordinated efforts and complementary roles. 
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While it would be unreasonable to suggest that further improvement in animal welfare in the EU 
is dependent on the creation of a Network of welfare RCs, this goal would certainly be advanced 
by such a Network, as a means to identifying and remedying bottlenecks in welfare policy 
implementation and widening the uptake of best practice. As Blokhuis et al. (2013) have 
commented, ‘Given that there is considerable variation both in environmental and production 
practices within Europe and that specific expertise is available in different Member States, such 
a Network could clearly create valuable synergies and could benefit from the consideration 
and/or incorporation of existing national practices and information’.  The existence of numerous 
Networks of reference centres with similar functions in other spheres, certainly attests to the 
proven capacity enhancing benefits that such Networks can provide (Fraser et al., 2009). 
 
Reflections at October 2016 
 
Recent developments in the EU i.e. the ‘Brexit’ vote in the UK, have highlighted the requirement 
for the Network to have a structure flexible enough to accommodate the involvement of both 
new EU and non-EU members.  Withdrawal from the EU certainly does not preclude the 
possibility of UK membership of the Network.  The UK has been a world leader in promoting the 
welfare of farmed animals and the UK government 10-year strategy document (Defra, 2004) 
signalled a policy aspiration to continue to achieve world-leading standards of farmed animal 
health and welfare.  In light of this, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the UK might seek to 
join the welfare Network to secure a number of benefits such as co-ordination and integration of 
research activity and sharing of best practice etc.  Should the post Brexit UK seek membership 
of the Network, the organisational framework proposed here is flexible enough to permit this, 
conditional upon a very modest contribution to administrative costs, although it is unlikely that 
the UK would be able to host one of the RCs.  Access might also be available to other non-EU 
states. 
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It hardly seems necessary to argue the case that the study reported here addressed a very real 
policy need. However, one uncertainty remains i.e. does the recommendation arising from this 
analysis provide an optimal and politically acceptable organisational structure for the Welfare 
Network? Ultimately, this question will only be answered when policy-makers take their final 
decision to establish the Network of Welfare Centres and agree on the organisational structure 
that the Network will have. At the time of writing, the Regulation to provide the legal basis for the 
establishment of the Centres has still not been produced. However, there have been some 
policy developments towards this goal.  For example, the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety accepted a report (European Parliament, 2014) amending the wording 
of Article 95 to state that the Commission ‘WILL’ designate RCs rather than the former ‘MAY’.  It 
is, therefore, quite certain that at some point in the near future, possibly in 2017, the Regulation 
required to establish the Network will be put before the Commission, Council and Parliament. 
The discussions leading to the production of this are still ongoing and the study reported here 
will contribute to that debate. We are confident that through the use of this particular analytical 
framework, an organisational structure has been identified, from among a number of 
alternatives, that stands the best chance of meeting the prescribed requirements for the Welfare 
Network, and the constraints within which it must operate. At the very least, the analysis 
reported here should provide EU policy-makers with a wealth of relevant data and 
understandings on which an informed policy choice can be based. 
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Table 1: Criteria used to assess the functioning of existing models of pan-European networks. 
 Criteria Weight 
1. Has solely a co-ordinating role. It is not a Competent Authority. 8 
2. Avoids duplication of work/roles (e.g. between Competent Authority, DG-SANCO...). 4 
3. Networks all existing national and transnational organisations and stakeholder groups. 4 
4. Cost of running the Network (budget does not exceed € 5.8 million). 2 
5. Is financially supported by several sources. 2 
6. Organisational structure can cope with addition of new stakeholder organisations. 1 
7. Organisational structure can cope with addition of new members. 8 
8. Is capable of broadening its scope in future (e.g. inclusion of zoo, companion and 
laboratory animals etc.). 
8 
9. Organisational structure allows for collaboration with non-EU member countries. 4 
10. Organisational structure allows for integration of private and public stakeholder groups. 1 
11. Can be proactive as well as reactive. 8 
12. Monitors efficiency and efficacy of own knowledge transfer activities. 4 
13. Has a relatively low administrative burden (on all parties). 2 
14. Has a high level of reactivity (e.g.  non-compliance is rapidly detected and the Network 
can propose and put in place a strategy to overcome the problem). 
4 
15. Stimulates knowledge exchanges on the issue of animal welfare, leading to innovation. 4 
Source: Veissier et al. (2013). 
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Table 2.  Factors identified as impacting on the suitability of the organisational structures of the 
short-listed co-ordinating organisations. 
Dimension Factors 
Political 
Co-ordinating Body/Management Board location  
Direct/indirect involvement of national actors  
Legal status of the Co-ordinating Body (independent/EU service) 
Strategy setting (centralised /decentralised)  
Top-down/bottom-up decision-making approaches 
Economic 
Cost of the Network  
Funding (EU/Member States) 
Social 
Ability to capture cultural differences and to tailor training and information to 
local conditions 
Active/reactive engagement of national actors  
Direct/Indirect engagement of national representatives in decision making  
Emphasis on societal concerns  
Enabling stakeholders’ trust 
Technical 
Exchange of knowledge between actors  
Level of scientific expertise  
Organisational 
Effectiveness 
Flexibility (in terms of composition, functioning and themes covered) 
Source: Veissier et al. (2013).
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Table 3: The SWEPSOT analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the regional 
organisational structure.  
Strengths Weaknesses 
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l  7 year rotation of RCs 
 Link with the Commission (DG SANCO) with a 
major influence on policy 
 Network perceived as an arm of EU 
enforcement and, therefore, not neutral  
 CB has no statutory powers but just a 
co-ordination and advisory role 
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
  RC and national partner institutes may be pre-
existing organisations situated in MS  
 Most dissemination and training carried out by 
national partner institutes and therefore funded 
by non-EU (national) sources  
 Low administrative burden and costs  
 
S
o
c
ia
l 
 The prominent involvement of DG SANCO may 
lead to increased stakeholder trust  
 Active engagement of national stakeholders 
who provide input through national institutes 
 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
 Weaknesses of both the centralised and 
decentralised approach are minimised by a 
mixed approach based on 5 regional sub-
Networks.  
 The structure allows for high reactivity in finding 
technical solutions  
 Risk of fragmentation and isolation 
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
 Quick and simple exchange of knowledge and 
information among members in each sub-
network and between sub-networks 
 Decentralisation of knowledge transfer and 
training performed by national partner institutes 
can capture local conditions 
 Rotation of RCs stimulates scientific excellence 
and efficiency  
 Regional structure reduces language barriers 
 Region-based RCs might be weak on 
some specific topics/issues 
 
Source: Veissier et al. (2013). 
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Figure 1: The regional organisational structure chosen for the Network.  
 
 
Key: 
RC = Reference Centre; ALL = coverage of all species and topics; P = partners. 
Source: Veissier et al. (2013).  
 
 
